Top 5 Worst Submarine Disasters of All Time

Top 5 Worst Submarine Disasters of All Time

Top 5 Worst Submarine Disasters of All Time

How would you like to spend months living in a cramped metal tube hundreds of meters below the surface of the sea, surrounding by nothing but darkness? Would you still volunteer for this job knowing that all that separated you from instant death was a few inches of steel? Or that if that steel were to fail, you would actually be incinerated by the water compressing all the air and igniting the oxygen like a piston, before being crushed and turned into a jelly?

Or even worse- you could survive in a watertight compartment, only to drop to the bottom of the ocean with a dull thump as you sit in cold, wet, darkness for days, waiting for the oxygen to run out. Because when things go wrong on a submarine, even the best case scenario is almost always a death sentence.

This show is not for the faint of heart. These are the worst submarine disasters in history.


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Content

0.12 -> How would you like to spend months living in a  cramped metal tube hundreds of meters below the  
5.1 -> surface of the sea, surrounding by nothing but  darkness? Would you still volunteer for this job  
9.6 -> knowing that all that separated you from instant  death was a few inches of steel? Or that if that  
15.48 -> steel were to fail, you would actually be  incinerated by the water compressing all  
19.56 -> the air and igniting the oxygen like a piston,  before being crushed and turned into a jelly?
24.72 -> Or even worse- you could survive  in a watertight compartment,  
28.14 -> only to drop to the bottom of the ocean  with a dull thump as you sit in cold, wet,  
33.06 -> darkness for days, waiting for the oxygen to run  out. Because when things go wrong on a submarine,  
38.4 -> even the best case scenario is  almost always a death sentence.
41.88 -> This show is not for the faint of heart. These  are the worst submarine disasters in history.
47.58 -> Russian Submarine Nerpa – 2008
50.4 -> Imagine hearing the sudden clanging of waterproof  doors shutting behind and in front of you,  
55.2 -> followed by the sudden roar of a strange gas  entering the chamber you've been locked into.  
60.24 -> It displaces all the oxygen, eventually  driving it from your lungs as well.  
64.32 -> You're asphyxiating in full atmosphere,  desperately clawing at the window where  
68.7 -> the rest of the crew watches you slowly  choke to death, unable to help you.
72.96 -> Now imagine that all of this  is happening because some idiot  
76.08 -> was messing around with equipment he  wasn’t even meant to have access to.
79.2 -> This was the fate of 20 people aboard the Russian  submarine Nerpa, An Akula-class submarine, the  
85.32 -> Nerpa was undergoing sea trials before formally  joining the Russian navy. On the 8th of November,  
90.18 -> she was deep beneath the waves of the  Russian Pacific Fleet's test range in  
94.44 -> Peter the Great Gulf, an inlet of the Sea of  Japan. On board the submarine were 208 people,  
99.78 -> an oversized compliment made up of 81 actual  military personnel and 127 engineers from  
106.32 -> the shipyards which had built and fitted the sub.  This is not an uncommon practice in world navies,  
111.48 -> as it allows for engineers to be on board  as systems undergo troubleshooting- and  
115.8 -> it's a hell of a motivator to  make sure you do your job right,  
118.38 -> because there's little chance of rescue if you  messed up designing or building your submarine.
123.6 -> At around 8 PM the Nerpa underwent its first  dive, and a half hour later disaster struck.  
129 -> All was going well- when suddenly two forward  compartments were sealed by automatically  
133.2 -> locking doors. The watertight doors are meant  to seal in case of emergency, and cannot be  
137.82 -> easily over-ridden. Approximately 60 people  were cut off from the rest of the submarine.
142.26 -> Inside the sealed compartments, confusion  reigned- until suddenly the crew noticed  
146.94 -> that the automatic fire fighting system had  engaged. Now dibromotetrafluoroethane began to  
152.64 -> flood the compartment, displacing all of the  oxygen. This gas is specifically engineered  
157.5 -> to suppress fires and then interfere with the  chemical process of combustion itself. However,  
162.3 -> in high concentrations it can cause  narcosis, leading straight to death  
166.56 -> via asphyxiation- plus inflicting injury via  frostbite due to its extreme chilling effect.
172.74 -> The trapped crew began to beat fervently  on the doors, but it would be 30 minutes  
177.12 -> before the fire suppression system  was disabled and the room ventilated,  
181.62 -> only then were the men actually rescued. The  destroyer Admiral Tributs and the submarine  
186.54 -> rescue vessel Sayany were dispatched  immediately to provide assistance,  
190.38 -> but the submarine was able to return  under its own power back to port.
193.74 -> 41 people were injured either by the  asphyxiation or the frostbite effect  
197.7 -> of the gas on their lungs. Another 20 would die.
200.82 -> Two official causes were  investigated by the Russians.
203.64 -> The Nerpa's fire suppression system  was state of the art for the time,  
206.76 -> while older systems relied on manual activation,  the Nerpa's new system could be set to automatic  
212.46 -> mode. This allowed the submarine to monitor  itself for any fires and immediately move to  
217.38 -> extinguish them. With fire being the  worst nightmare for any submariner,  
221.34 -> the value of such a high tech automatic  system could not be understated.
224.94 -> In order to avoid suffocating, crew  were extensively drilled on how to  
229.02 -> properly respond to the activation of the  fire fighting system, which was preceded  
233.04 -> by klaxons and warning lights. Men in the  affected compartments were to immediately  
237.3 -> don oxygen masks in order to survive the  half hour it would take to ventilate the  
241.56 -> compartment. This is one big reason why so many  were seriously injured or died- most of those  
246.42 -> in the affected compartments were civilian  engineers who had not received such training.
251.16 -> While the Nerpa's fire fighting system  was state of the art, it was also Russian,  
254.88 -> which left it prone to multiple malfunctions  during its installation on the sub. According to  
259.92 -> testimony from one of the engineers who helped  build the sub, the fire fighting system had  
263.94 -> malfunctioned before and the 2008 tragedy  could have been another such malfunction.
268.62 -> However, a second, even dumber explanation  exists. Five days after the accident,  
273.96 -> naval investigators announced that crewman  Dmitry Grobov had been responsible,  
279 -> turning on the system quote- without permission  or any particular grounds. In plain speak,  
284.52 -> this means that Grobov was messing around, as  bored sailors are known to do- though typically  
289.62 -> in professional navies they don't murder  or injure dozens of people as a result.
293.28 -> According to military reports,  Grobov started playing with the  
296.82 -> fire suppression system out of boredom,  believing that it had been disconnected.  
300.72 -> Local control units are protected by five  digit access codes, but during sea trials  
305.52 -> the access codes were stenciled directly onto the  units. Grobov accessed the panel, increased the  
311.58 -> readings coming from the affected compartments  from 30 degrees calcium- or whatever Europeans  
316.92 -> measure with- to 78 degrees chocobo. The system  asked for permission to do its job, and Grobov  
323.46 -> granted it- no doubt thinking this was the most  cutting edge video technology in all of Russia.
328.08 -> Colleagues were skeptical of the military  report though, describing Grobov as a skilled  
333.06 -> and experienced specialist. To be honest, since  the Russian military's performance in the Ukraine  
337.56 -> war we've learned that this in no way excluded  the possibility of Grobov stupidly murdering two  
342.54 -> dozen people out of inept boredom. Others doubted  that Grobov could have done this alone because the  
347.46 -> system required multiple levels of confirmation  before being activated- and all that means is  
352.38 -> that multiple Russian sailors were equally inept.  We're really trying hard not to be biased here,  
357.24 -> but this is the same navy that is currently  losing a war against a nation with no navy.
361.8 -> Because this is Russia, Mikhail Barabanov,  editor-in-chief of Moscow Defense Brief,  
367.26 -> said that accidental discharges of fire  suppression systems aboard Russian submarines  
371.4 -> weren’t unheard of, though they usually don’t  result in fatalities since the crew is trained  
376.26 -> how to react. For new Russian submariners it  must be a real morale boost to know that they  
381.06 -> receive constant training to know how to react  in case of a disastrous fire- or if the submarine  
386.34 -> randomly decides to try to kill you because  oh by the way, it will absolutely do that.
391.32 -> ARA San Juan, Argentina – 2017
394.68 -> The San Juan was a diesel-electric submarine in  service with the Argentinian navy since 1985.  
400.74 -> Just a few years prior to its disappearance  though, it had undergone midlife maintainance,  
405.18 -> upgrading its engine and batteries.  A small, diesel-electric attack sub,  
409.08 -> it was a stealthy boat that in 1994  managed to evade US anti-submarine  
414.18 -> forces during an exercise and 'sink'  the US command ship, USS Mount Whitney.
419.4 -> On November 17th, 2017 though, tragedy struck-  and the reason why still remains a mystery.
425.4 -> The day before it went missing, the sub  had sent a report that the snorkel had  
429.06 -> leaked water into the forward storage  batteries, causing a small fire. The  
433.26 -> fire however was extinguished successfully, and  the batteries disconnected to prevent further  
437.34 -> problems. The submarine then continued on its  mission using power from its aft batteries.
441.78 -> For two days, the submarine failed to report  in- at which point a search was immediately  
446.22 -> launched. The last known location  was recorded on the 15th of November,  
450 -> when the boat was 430 kilometers- or 270 moon  landing miles- off the coast of Argentina,  
456.12 -> in the San Jorge Gulf and on its way to Mar  del Plata. The boat had just concluded an  
461.52 -> exercise with the Argentinian navy  and was heading to deeper waters.
464.46 -> The search was under taken with the assistance  of the International Submarine Escape and Rescue  
469.08 -> Liason Office, which had been established by  40 countries in 2003 as a result of the Kursk  
474.48 -> disaster. With a search area of 482,507  kilometers- 186,297 proper square miles-  
482.58 -> and alternating weather conditions, it was  like finding a needle in a turbulent hay  
487.29 -> stack. With no success and only 7 days  of oxygen on board, hope was dwindling.
491.94 -> Argentina requested the use of hydrophones  operated by the Preparatory Comission for  
496.44 -> the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty  Organization for help in its search. This  
501.36 -> global network of hydrophones had been  installed to prevent nations from cheating  
505.02 -> on the nuclear test ban treaty by blowing up  nukes underwater. Searching the CTBO's records,  
510.18 -> an anomaly consistent with the sound of  a submarine implosion was confirmed on  
514.14 -> November 23rd. The event also matched closely  with the loss of communication with the sub.
519.12 -> The search continued in the hopes of at least  finding the wreckage, possibly even survivors  
524.04 -> in a watertight compartment- though all knew  hope was slim. By November 24th the search  
528.96 -> involved 13 countries, including the United  States, Argentia, Brazil, Chile, and even  
534.42 -> former Falklands War rival, the United Kingdom.  Searching an area the size of Spain though,  
539.16 -> Argentina was forced to concede on November 30th,  fifteen days after the San Juan went missing,  
543.9 -> that rescue efforts were over. There  was now only the search for wreckage.
547.74 -> A year later, the remains of the crushed submarine  were discovered at a depth of 907 meters,  
553.32 -> just 12 kilometers- or 12 miles-  from the location of the implosion  
557.1 -> sound. All 44 crewmen were lost, including  Argentina's first female submarine officer.
563.1 -> KRI Nanggala, Indonesia – 2021
566.22 -> Originally purchased in 1977, the nearly fifty  year old submarine had undergone two major refits  
572.64 -> in its life. The latest, in 2012, was undertaken  in a South Korean shipyard and modernized many  
578.16 -> of the sub's Cold War systems. In a possible  forewarning of disaster to come though, three  
583.2 -> crew members were killed just months after the  South Korean refit when a torpedo failed to launch  
588.36 -> during an exercise. The Nanggala was damaged  enough that it needed to be sent back for repairs.
593.1 -> On April 21st, 2021, the Nanggala was undergoing  torpedo drills. At 3 AM, the captain asked for  
599.58 -> permission to dive in order to fire a live  torpedo. By 4 AM the sub was flooding its  
604.74 -> torpedo tubes and at 4:25 the Indonesian navy  received its last communication as the commanding  
610.38 -> officer of the training task force sent his  authorization to go ahead with the firing.
614.1 -> The Nanggala fired a live torpedo and  then a training torpedo- and went silent.
619.32 -> By 9:37 AM, the navy sent a distress call  to the International Submarine Escape and  
624.3 -> Rescue Liasion Office, declaring  the submarine missing and likely  
627.9 -> sunk. It was believed that the submarine  could have experienced a power outage,  
631.62 -> causing it to plummet to a depth of around  600 to 700 meters. This was really bad news  
636.84 -> as the sub only had a crush depth of 500 meters. A  previous power outage had nearly caused disaster,  
642.66 -> with the boat being saved by the emergency  blowing of the forward ballast tanks.
646.92 -> While submarines typically have a greater crush  depth than publicly recorded, the Bali sea is  
652.62 -> known for its underwater canyons which can reach  depths of over 1,500 meters. If the Nanggala had  
658.56 -> fallen into one of these canyons, its fate was  sealed. However, if the submarine had lost power  
663.42 -> and come to rest above its crush depth, the  crew had approximately three days of oxygen  
668.28 -> to survive on. But others expressed doubt- the  submarine was supposed to carry only 38 people,  
673.8 -> but had been loaded with 53 when it was lost.  That would cut their oxygen almost in half.
679.44 -> A crisis center with a mobile hyperbaric  chamber was established at 2nd Fleet Command  
684.36 -> HQ in Surabya, and soon multiple nations had  joined in the search effort. The United States  
689.76 -> sent multiple Poseidon aircraft which  specialized in hunting down submarines,  
693.96 -> Singapore deployed submarine rescue vessels,  and the Royal Malaysian navy sent the MV Mega  
699.66 -> Bakti submarine rescue ship. The Indian Navy made  available its deep-submergence rescue vehicle,  
705.12 -> which departed from Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh  and would be at the search site within days.
710.4 -> Indonesian divers began searching for the sub in  shalower water, while warships, other submarines,  
715.98 -> and multiple aircraft began to look around the  last known location of the Nanggala. On April  
720.9 -> 22nd, at 7 AM, traces of an oil spill- possibly  fuel from and lubricating oils from the submarine-  
726.78 -> were discovered near where the boat had been  observed diving. Hydrophones in the area confirmed  
731.46 -> that whatever had happened, there had not been an  implosion, keeping hopes alive. A false detection  
736.98 -> of a magnetic object by an Indonesian cruiser  raised hopes, but the sub was not located.
741.54 -> On the 24th, the Indonesia navy announced the  discovery of debris, including a part associated  
747.12 -> with torpedo tubes, a coolant pipe insulator,  a bottle of periscope grease, and prayer rugs,  
753 -> all within 10 miles of the last point of  contact. The Nanggala was declared sunk,  
757.56 -> and later a sonar scan discovered the submarine  at a depth of 850 meters- 350 meters past its  
764.22 -> officialc crush depth. An ROV with a max depth  of 1,000 meters was launched by the Singaporian  
769.26 -> ship MV Swift Rescue, which made visual contact  with the remains of the submarine on the bottom.
774.12 -> The submarine had split into three parts, and  it was not believed to have imploded given no  
779.1 -> recorded implosion sounds on nearby hydrophones. A  power outage was suspected, as previously a blown  
785.58 -> electrical fuse forced the emergency blowing of  the main ballast tank so the sub could surface.  
790.26 -> There were also suspicions of the work done by  the South Korean firm which undertook the boat's  
794.76 -> refit in 2012, given the failed torpedo firing  test later that year that killed three. However,  
800.82 -> others pointed at the submarine being 15  people over its max capacity of 38 personnel.
805.98 -> Later it was revealed that the commander  of the Nanggala, Lt. Colonel Heri Oktavian,  
810.54 -> had voiced frustrations over the poor maintenance  the sub had received to a reported who published  
816.3 -> an article with his complaints. Oktavian  complained of poor quality work as well  
820.5 -> as frequent delays by state-owned shipyard  PT PAL Indonesia. Another officer had been  
826.44 -> disciplined by his superiors after voicing  his own complaints about poor workmanship  
830.7 -> from the state-owned shipyard, which had  assembled the Changbogo class KRI Alugorok,  
835.98 -> another submarine of which Lt. Colonel  Oktavian commented, “This submarine by PT PAL,  
841.68 -> there's nothing good about it.” The Nanggala was  also apparently nearly 12 years behind schedule  
847.08 -> on major maintenance, despite subs needing  to go in for major refits every six years.
852.18 -> No. 361, China- 2003
855.48 -> It's one of the most tragic submarine  disasters in history, and it left the  
859.8 -> submarine itself completely untouched.  Despite the staggering loss of life,  
863.7 -> if you had to die in a submarine accident, this is  probably about as gentle as it's going to happen.
869.1 -> No. 361 was an aging boat by the time of  her accident, and this likely led to her  
874.26 -> disaster. A Ming III-class submarine, she  was a clone of the old Soviet Romeo-class,  
878.94 -> built between the 1950s and early  60s. A diesel-electric boat,  
883.02 -> she was meant for coastal defense missions  and incapable of true blue water operations.
887.7 -> In the early 2000s, China was beginning to assert  itself against the United States in the South  
892.44 -> Pacific. Laying down the foundations of what it  would ultimately call anti-access/area-denial,  
897.6 -> China undertook a massive ramp up  in training and exercises with its  
901.8 -> submarine forces. Its subs may have been  vastly outclassed by modern US boats,  
906.3 -> but even an old submarine can present a  significant threat in the right circumstance.
910.44 -> On April 16th, 2003, the No. 361 was partaking  in naval exercises east of the inner Changshan  
917.88 -> Islands in the Yellow Sea, just off the coast  of northeastern China. The crew included a full  
923.1 -> complement along with 13 trainee cadets from the  Chinese naval academy. The exercise was simulating  
928.8 -> real wartime conditions and thus the submarine  was out of contact for days or even weeks at a  
934.56 -> time. The Chinese military however did not have a  strong history of realistic training- something it  
940.02 -> continues to struggle with- and this, coupled  with the age of the boat and possible toll of  
944.46 -> corruption within the Chinese military, could  all have contributed to what happened next.
948.3 -> At some point in time while submerged,  the submarine's diesel engine failed to  
952.56 -> shut down properly. It's believed that exhaust  would have quickly overwhelmed the submarine,  
956.94 -> poisoning the crew. The ongoing running  of the engine would have also used up all  
961.08 -> available oxygen, dooming anyone who  survived poisoning from the exhaust.
965.04 -> It's not exactly clear how any of this happened,  or why the submarine didn't immediately surface  
970.2 -> and evacuate its crew. It's important to remember  that the Chinese military in the early 2000s was  
975.18 -> not particularly well known for its competency,  and corruption was rampant- two legacies that  
980.58 -> continue to haunt the Chinese to this day. With  senior officers on board who may not have been the  
985.8 -> best qualified for their position, it's possible  that bad command helped fuel an unfolding crisis.
991.14 -> China has remained extremely tight lipped about  the incident even in the two decades since,  
995.4 -> and it's rumored that the crew was all discovered  dead at their posts, meaning asphyxiation happened  
1000.32 -> relatively quickly. How this could have happened  without some safety system alerting the crew  
1004.82 -> shows just how bad a shape the People's  Liberation Army Navy was in at the time.
1008.84 -> Kursk disaster, Russia – 2000
1011.66 -> “Stunning breaches of discipline, shoddy,  obsolete, and poorly maintained equipment.”  
1016.22 -> “Negligence, incompetence, and mismanagement.”  So reads excerpts from the official Russian  
1021.5 -> investigation into one of the worst submarine  disasters in history- excerpts that shocked the  
1026.12 -> world at the time, but wouldn't surprise anyone  observing Russia's current performance in Ukraine.
1031.16 -> The Kursk was designed with one role in mind:  to take on and defeat an entire American carrier  
1036.38 -> strike group all on its own. It was one of the  biggest cruise missile submarines ever built,  
1041 -> second only to America's Ohio-class after  a number of their class were converted to  
1045.68 -> carry cruise missiles. Its Type 65 torpedo  carried a 450 kilogram (990 lbs) warhead  
1050.66 -> which could conceivably destroy or at least  mission-kill a carrier with just one hit.
1055.46 -> She was the pinnacle of Soviet submarine  design, and a deadly threat even into the  
1060.38 -> start of the new millennium- but she was also  in service with the worst navy in the world.
1064.34 -> The Kursk had only undertaken a single  deployment in her entire 5 year career,  
1068.36 -> spending six months monitoring the US Sixth  Fleet as it responded to the war in Kosovo.  
1073.4 -> With a collapsing post-Soviet economy, there was  simply no room in the budget to buy fuel for her  
1078.38 -> nuclear reactors, and some sailors in the Northern  Fleet had even gone without pay. Needless to say,  
1083.66 -> training, discipline, and basic standards were  catastrophically low, and a lack of deployments  
1088.64 -> meant her crew had little to no experience.  All of these factors started to add up,  
1092.48 -> and on her last deployment, accompanied by 118  Russian sailors, tragedy struck the Soviet sub.
1098.42 -> On August 12th, 2000, the Kursk was participating  in the first major naval exercise for the Russian  
1104.12 -> fleet in ten years, and the first since the fall  of the Soviet Union. Russia was looking to remind  
1109.16 -> the world that it was still a formidable  superpower. The Kursk took center stage,  
1113.6 -> the pride and joy of the Northern Fleet, with  her crew having recently won a citation for  
1118.28 -> excellent performance and recognized as the  best submarine crew in the entire fleet- the  
1123.5 -> bar must have been pretty low given the  report that would follow the accident.
1126.86 -> Unlike other submarines, the Kursk was  one of the few authorized to carry a full  
1130.88 -> combat load at all times, including  torpedoes, anti-submarine missiles,  
1135.44 -> and the fearsome Granit anti-ship missile. She  also enjoyed the title of being 'unsinkable',  
1140.48 -> with sailors claiming she could even withstand a  direct hit from a torpedo- which really goes to  
1145.4 -> show the quality of Russian sailors at the time.  Baffling boasts aside, she was a state of the art  
1150.68 -> vessel for the Russian navy, and a luxurious  craft at that, with both the officers and  
1155.18 -> enlisted enjoying the use of gymnasiums and even  a spa inside a hull as long as two jumbo jets.
1161.84 -> At 8:51 in the morning, the Kursk  requested permission to conduct  
1165.26 -> a torpedo training launch using  dummy torpedoes launched at the  
1169.1 -> battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy. She received  approval and at 11:29 AM loaded the first  
1174.8 -> practice torpedo into the number-4  torpedo tube on the starboard side.
1178.52 -> Thirty four seconds later, the Norwegian  seismic array and other seismic detectors  
1183.32 -> around the world recorded a seismic event  of a 1.5 magnitude on the Richter scale.  
1188.12 -> The location was in the Barents sea  off the northern coast of Russia and  
1192.08 -> near Norway, squarely on top of  the Kursk's last known position.
1195.68 -> Two minutes and fourteen seconds after the  first event, a second event with the power  
1200.42 -> of a small earthquake and measuring at 4.2 on  the Richter scale was registered on seismographs  
1206.06 -> across all of northern Europe. The event was  detected as far away as Alaska, register as an  
1211.34 -> explosion with the equivalent power of to two  to three tons of TNT. The second explosion was  
1216.44 -> logged as taken place at the same depth as the sea  bed, leaving little doubt as to what had occurred.
1221.72 -> The crew of the submarine Karelia  had detected the two explosions,  
1225.08 -> but the captain believed it was simply part  of the ongoing exercise. The Pyotr Velikiy,  
1229.52 -> target of the Kursk's dummy torpedo attack,  recorded the hydroacoustic signal of an  
1234.08 -> underwater explosion and felt their own ship  shudder from the immense force. They radioed  
1238.76 -> the event back to fleet headquarters  but were naturally, completely ignored  
1242.42 -> because explosions massive enough to shake  battlecruisers are apparently common in Russia.
1246.98 -> At 1:30 PM, the Kursk was expected to complete  its fake attack run, but there was still no news  
1252.44 -> from the submarine. With communications  equipment along with everything else in a  
1256.28 -> general state of disrepair, comm blackouts  were not unexpected and thus nobody was  
1261.02 -> initially alarmed- though the Pyotr Velikiy did  dispatch a helicopter to look for the submarine.
1265.94 -> When the helicopter failed to find signs of  the submarine, the Northern fleet finally  
1269.96 -> began to take the situation seriously. With a  missing submarine and reports of two explosions  
1274.58 -> in the training grounds, concern led to the  alerting of the fleet's head of search and  
1278.48 -> rescue forces. The primary rescue ship was a  converted 20 year old former lumber carrier,  
1283.88 -> equipped with two deep-submergence rescue  vehicles, a diving bell, lifting cranes,  
1288.5 -> and other specialized gear. What it lacked  however were stabilisers to keep the vessel  
1292.82 -> in the right position in rough seas, and thus was  only capable of carrying out rescue operations in  
1297.8 -> calm waters. Due to budget woes, two India-class  submarines equipped with deep-submergence rescue  
1303.14 -> vehicles were permanently held up in shipyards  awaiting repairs for the last six years.
1307.7 -> Search and rescue efforts however did not proceed  until 6:30 PM, after an Ilyushin Il-38 aircraft  
1314.42 -> had failed to spot the submarine and the Kursk was  now overdue for a scheduled communications check.  
1319.64 -> At 10:30 PM, the Northern fleet declared an  emergency as additional aircraft and ships  
1324.92 -> failed to locate the Kursk anywhere on the  surface, and the exercise was stopped. At  
1329.6 -> midnight, the sole operational rescue  vessel in the fleet finally left port.
1333.56 -> Vladimir Putin, who had recently  been elected to help destroy Russia,  
1336.98 -> was not informed of the Kursk's disappearance  until 7 AM the next day. The entire time, the  
1342.14 -> Russian navy continued to downplay the seriousness  of the incident, but word was starting to spread  
1347 -> across Russia and the international community  both. Later that Sunday, the Northern fleet  
1351.92 -> commander continued to downplay the incident,  holding a press briefing to announce the results  
1356 -> of the now-canceled exercise, stating that the  entire operation had been a resounding success.
1361.16 -> However, at the Vidyaevo Naval Base, a  telephone operator overheard a conversation  
1365.72 -> stating that a submarine was in serious  trouble, eventually catching the Kursk's  
1370.1 -> name. News from the small base soon  reached the ears of family members,  
1373.46 -> but they were assured by the deputy base commander  that nothing out of the ordinary was occurring.
1377.66 -> On the same day that the Kursk had sunk, even  before the Kremlin had been informed, the United  
1382.64 -> States was already aware of the disaster, and  swiftly moved to inform its NATO allies. The  
1387.8 -> United States, Britain, France, Germany, Israel,  Italy, and Norway- many of which had vessels  
1392.84 -> already near the accident site- all offered aid  in rescuing possible survivors- but the Russian  
1398.3 -> government refused, claiming that the rescue  was well under way. The Russian Navy eventually  
1402.68 -> held a press conference informing people of the  disaster, but claimed that rescue was imminent.
1407 -> It was not.
1408.08 -> A day after the sinking, one of the two rescue  submersibles aboard the fleet's sole rescue  
1413.18 -> vessel collided with wreckage from the Kursk,  slightly damaging the vehicle. The damaged  
1418.16 -> rescue submersible was forced to rise, having  confirmed the location of the Kursk's propeller  
1422.78 -> and stern stabilizer- but not the submarine  itself. The second submersible was prepared  
1427.52 -> for operations and launched four hours later  at 10:40 PM, but was given a wrong heading by  
1433.1 -> the Pytor Velikiy and forced to resurface at 1 AM  on Monday morning without having found the Kursk.
1438.74 -> The salvage tug Nikolay Chiker managed to use  deep-water camera equipment to get images of  
1444.02 -> the Kursk, showing severe damage to the bow and  it sail, with the body of the submarine listing  
1449.36 -> at twenty five degrees. The bow had burrowed  itself 22 meters into the seabed at a depth of 108  
1455.3 -> meters, well above the Kursk's crush depth. Its  periscope was also discovered to still be raised,  
1460.52 -> indicating that the accident had occurred while  she was just twenty meters from the surface.
1464.66 -> The first rescue submersible was repaired and  re-launched at 5 AM on Monday morning. Nearly  
1470.06 -> two hours later it located the Kursk and tried  without success to attach to the aft escape trunk  
1475.4 -> over the Kursk's ninth compartment. Since the sub  was above crush depth, and most of the damage was  
1480.74 -> to the bow, there was good reason to hope that  at least some of the crew had survived in the  
1485.18 -> rearward watertight compartments. However, unable  to create a vacuum seal with the escape trunk,  
1489.98 -> the sub's batteries were quickly exhausted and it  was forced to surface. With no spare batteries,  
1495.32 -> the crew had to wait until the onboard batteries  were recharged, but by that time sea conditions  
1500.36 -> had worsened and the Russians were unable  to continue launching rescue operations.
1503.9 -> That morning, Monday August 14th, the  Russian ministry of defense made its  
1508.46 -> first official announcement concerning the  incident. It claimed that the submarine had  
1512.12 -> quote- descended to the ocean floor- which was  technically true. According to the Russian MoD,  
1517.82 -> the crew had been forced to ground the  submarine due to a mechanical breakdown,  
1521.78 -> but air and power were being pumped to  the submarine from the surface. This  
1526.1 -> was at least 50% true, though the crew had had  exactly zero choice in the immediate grounding  
1531.86 -> of the Kursk. The MoD also claimed that  they were in radio contact with the crew.
1536 -> The weather worsened considerably over the next  two days, during which the Russians attempted  
1540.38 -> to connect a diving bell to the sub twice,  and attach an ROV to the rescue hatch with  
1544.82 -> no success. One of the rescue submersibles  was launched again late on Tuesday night,  
1549.44 -> but was damaged as it struck a boom while being  lowered into the turbulent waters and had to  
1554.6 -> be brought back on board for repairs.  It was relaunched over an hour later,  
1558.32 -> but again failed to make contact with the  sunken Kursk. That same day, now three  
1562.94 -> days after the sinking, a crane ship with more  advanced rescue submersibles finally arrived,  
1567.68 -> but was unable to launch due to bad weather.  The Russians instead moved closer to the coast  
1572.36 -> and launched a rescue submersible there, then  simply towed it to deeper water over the Kursk.
1577.04 -> At 12:20 AM on Wednesday morning, a rescue  submersible attempted to attach to the ninth  
1582.44 -> compartment escape hatch but again failed to  create a seal. When it surfaced and was being  
1587.36 -> lifted back onto the deck of its mother ship, its  propulsion system was seriously damaged, forcing  
1592.58 -> the crew to cannibalize it for parts to repair one  of the other submersibles. The rescue submersible  
1597.26 -> being towed from the coast arrived shortly after  but also failed to latch onto one of the Kursk's  
1602 -> escape hatches, while a storm on the surface  damaged one of the rescue capsules still topside.
1606.56 -> Five days after the sinking, President Putin  finally accepted British and Norwegian help.  
1611.36 -> Six teams of British and Norwegian divers arrived  on Friday, August 18th. The next day, a full week  
1616.82 -> after the Kursk had been lost, a Norwegian ship  with a British rescue submarine arrived on site.  
1621.86 -> Russian naval officials placed restrictions on  what parts of the submarine the Norwegian divers  
1626.66 -> could work on, which significantly impeded their  rescue efforts. Upon locating the air-control  
1631.4 -> valve on the exterior of the submarine, Russian  experts warned the divers that they must open  
1635.9 -> it counter-clockwise or they would break it.  With the valve not budging, the divers went  
1640.64 -> against the Russian's advice and turned it in the  opposite direction, immediately opening the valve.
1645.14 -> On Monday, the 21st of August, the rescue trunk  was discovered to be full of water, dashing hopes  
1651.32 -> of rescuing any crew. Using a custom tool to open  the internal hatch leading to the rescue trunk,  
1656.66 -> the divers released a large volume of air from  the inside of the ninth compartment, discovering  
1661.52 -> multiple bodies. The Russian government finally  admitted that the submarine was completely flooded  
1666.32 -> and all crew had died- though again, they  were conveniently only telling half-truths.  
1671.36 -> The discovery of the air tight compartment nine  indicated that a number of the crew had survived  
1676.46 -> the initial disaster and sat on the bottom of  the sea awaiting rescue that came far too late.
1681.74 -> Norwegian divers used specialized tools  to cut holes in the hull of the submarine,  
1686.18 -> but only Russian divers were allowed to  enter the wreck itself, removing secret  
1689.96 -> documents and discovering badly burned bodies-  indicating that there had been a significant  
1694.28 -> explosion. Twelve bodies were pulled from  compartment nine, destroying the Russian  
1698.54 -> government's official story that all aboard  had died immediately upon the Kursk sinking.
1703.16 -> The official Russian story soon shifted to blaming  a collision with a NATO submarine or possibly a  
1708.86 -> World War II naval mine as the reason behind the  Kursk disaster. Many Russian hardliners adopted  
1714.26 -> the story of collision with a NATO submarine sent  to spy on the exercise, but there was never any  
1719.54 -> evidence given. An investigation panel was set  up, but most of the members on it had special  
1724.4 -> interest directly staked to the outcome of the  investigation, with no independent investigators  
1729.62 -> being allowed onto the special board, thus the  ultimate report was seen as not very credible.
1734.36 -> The official report blamed an explosion from  the practice torpedo caused by a leak of its  
1740.18 -> high-test peroxide fuel. This initial explosion  destroyed the torpedo room and killed everyone in  
1744.92 -> the first compartment, with a blast wave entering  as far back as the fourth compartment. Everyone  
1749.66 -> in the command post in the second compartment was  immediately incapacitated by the blast entering  
1754.46 -> via an air conditioning vent. The explosion caused  a fire which set off the warheads on five to seven  
1759.86 -> additional torpedoes, leading to the massive 4.2  Richter scale event detected around the world.
1764.96 -> However, the recovery of a partially burned set  of safety instructions for the operation of the  
1769.7 -> on-board torpedoes revealed that they were from a  completely different type of torpedo altogether.  
1774.5 -> The Russian navy was discovered to have never  inspected the Kursk's crew's qualifications to  
1779.96 -> handle and fire HTP torpedoes, and the crew in  fact had no experience or training with this  
1785.6 -> type of torpedo. Due to a lack of experience,  bad or no training, and equally bad leadership,  
1790.64 -> it's believed that the torpedo room crew  themselves directly caused the initial explosion.
1795.02 -> More tragically, while most of the crew  likely died, at least 24 had survived in the  
1800.42 -> ninth compartment long after the submarine sunk.  Captain-lieutenant Dmitry Kolesnikov had written  
1805.58 -> a note listing the name of the 23 other sailors  alive in the compartment after the Kursk sank.
1810.56 -> These men however all died when someone mishandled  a cartridge of potassium superoxide, used to power  
1816.8 -> a chemical oxygen generator. These cartridges  absorb carbon dioxide and release oxygen in  
1822.5 -> emergencies, but are highly reactive. Upon  coming in contact with sea water, the cartridge  
1828.08 -> immediately caused a flash fire which consumed all  remaining oxygen in the compartment. Investigation  
1833.24 -> of the wreckage showed that some of the men  avoided the initial fire by diving underwater,  
1837.62 -> but were forced to surface into an environment  with no remaining oxygen and asphyxiated.
1842.66 -> For five days after the disaster, Vladimir Putin-  who was only four months into his presidency-  
1847.34 -> continued to enjoy his holiday at the presidential  resort in Sochi on the Black Sea. As a result,  
1852.68 -> Putin's approval ratings, which had been  extremely high during his election bid,  
1856.64 -> plummeted drastically- but democracy is an  illusion in Russia so that doesn't really matter.
1862.16 -> Now go check out 50 submarine  facts that will shock you,  
1865.46 -> or click this other video  instead! The emperor protects.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnmbmp8UoUE